Healthcare resilience is moving up the political and security agenda in Europe, as policymakers and industry leaders warn that medical systems and medicine supply chains are becoming critical vulnerabilities in an increasingly unstable geopolitical environment.
At the Munich Security Conference (13–14 February 2026), discussions traditionally dominated by defense and military strategy expanded to include health system preparedness, workforce capacity, and pharmaceutical supply security — reflecting a broader shift in how “security” itself is being defined.
Participating in the conference, Germany’s Federal Minister of Health Nina Warken drew a direct connection between public health preparedness and national security planning.
“Crisis-resistant health care is a fundamental part of forward-looking security policy.”
Her visit focused on the resilience of healthcare systems, including the ability to maintain medical care during emergencies and complex crises. During sessions organised by the WHO Hub for Pandemic and Epidemic Intelligence, the World Health Summit, and the Bundeswehr, discussions addressed medical infrastructure, staffing capacity, data availability, and civil-military coordination.
Warken stressed that preparedness requires structural planning across multiple fronts:
“A resilient health care system is not a luxury, but a security necessity. We must design and strengthen our structures in such a way that they can also withstand crisis situations and provide the civilian population, the Bundeswehr and NATO partners with quality medical care.”
She outlined core pillars of resilience — stable supply chains, trained personnel, reliable infrastructure, and close coordination with national and international partners — noting that Germany is currently working on drafting a Health Emergency Act to formalize preparedness frameworks.
On the sidelines of the conference, the Minister also met international counterparts to discuss joint approaches to strengthening crisis response capacity across borders, underlining what she described as the “close links that exist between public health policy and security policy.”
Medicines as “strategic security assets”
The security framing was echoed — and sharpened — by the pharmaceutical industry.
Speaking at an official side-event, Simon Goeller, Chief Transformation & Growth Officer at Sandoz, called for a fundamental rethink of how Europe treats essential medicines within its security architecture.
“Europe must start to treat essential medicines as critical security infrastructure.”
According to Goeller, geopolitical tensions and hybrid warfare risks are exposing structural weaknesses in global pharmaceutical supply chains — particularly Europe’s reliance on external manufacturing.
“Current definitions of ‘security’ thinking in Europe remain too narrowly focused on military assets. Healthcare systems and medicine supply chains are still viewed as welfare policy, not as ‘hard’ security — despite everything we learned during Covid-19.”
He highlighted antibiotics as a key pressure point. Often described as the backbone of modern medicine, their production is heavily concentrated outside Europe.
Nearly 70% of global antibiotic API manufacturing sites are located in India and China, while more than 90% of 6-APA — the key starting material for penicillin — originates from China.
This concentration, he argued, creates a systemic risk.
“For penicillin, the reality is simple: Our site in Kundl is Europe’s last end-to-end penicillin facility, with fermentation, API manufacturing and finished dosage forms all under one roof. In times of hybrid warfare, that is not just an industrial asset; it is strategic infrastructure.”
From price efficiency to supply security
Goeller urged policymakers to rethink procurement and industrial policy priorities, warning that a singular focus on low-cost sourcing has eroded Europe’s domestic manufacturing base.
He argued that pharmaceuticals should be treated similarly to ammunition or critical raw materials in strategic planning — requiring stockpiles, redundancy, and regional production capacity.
“We need to protect what we still have, while we still have it. Once manufacturing capacity is lost, it cannot be rebuilt at a moment’s notice, however severe the crisis.”
His conclusion framed medicine policy in explicitly defense-oriented terms:
“Medicines policy is defense policy. If Europe wants to become resilient and independent, it must integrate medicine security into its broader security architecture — before it is too late.”
A widening definition of security
Taken together, the messages from Munich highlight a growing redefinition of European policy priorities.
Health system resilience — from hospital surge capacity to pharmaceutical manufacturing — is no longer viewed solely through a public health or welfare lens. Instead, it is increasingly positioned alongside energy security, food systems, and defense readiness as part of strategic sovereignty.
As geopolitical risks, pandemics, and supply chain disruptions converge, the conference discussions suggest that Europe’s preparedness planning may increasingly start not only in defense ministries — but also in health ministries and medicine production facilities.
18.02.2026.
